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Recent Developments 
Johnson v. State: 
Maryland Rule 4-204 Requires the Defendant's Consent if the State Makes a 
Substantive Change to a Charging Document 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
Maryland Rule 4-204 requires the 
defendant's consent if the State 
makes a substantive change to a 
charging document. Johnson v. 
State, 358 Md. 384, 749 A.2d 769 
(2000). The court held that 
amending information to substitute 
"cocaine" for "marijuana" was a 
change of substance rather than form 
because it changed the character of 
the offense charged. Moreover, the 
court held that such an amendment is 
prejudicial ifthe defendant does not 
consent. 
On June 20, 1997, Officer 
Mark Waltrop ("Waltrop") arrested 
the defendant, Steve Johnson 
("Johnson"), after observing 
Johnson with what appeared to be 
crack cocaine. Accordingly, police 
charged Johnson with possession of 
crack cocaine with intent to 
distribute, possession of crack 
cocaine, and possession of a firearm 
in violation of Md. Ann. Code art. 
27, section281A (1957, 1996 Repl. 
Vol.). 
In August 1997, the State's 
Attorney filed a five-count criminal . 
information in the Circuit Court for 
Talbot County. However, instead of 
charging Johnson with possession of 
cocaine, count one of the information 
charged Johnson with possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, and 
By Ingrid Abbott 
count two with unlawful possession of 
marijuana. The other counts were 
identical with the initial charges. In 
December 1997, the State moved to 
amend counts one and two of the 
information to charge Johnson with 
possession of cocaine instead of 
marijuana. Johnson refused to 
consent to the change. At a January 
1998 hearing, Johnson contended that 
the State's proposed amendment 
violated Maryland Rule 4-204 
because it changed the character of 
the offense charged and therefore 
required his consent. 
After the circuit court granted the 
State's motion, Johnson was 
convicted on all counts and sentenced. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the trial court's 
decision to grant the motion to amend. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to determine 
whether the amendment of counts one 
and two of the charging document 
violated Maryland Rule 4-204. 
The court of appeals observed 
that under Maryland Rule 4-204, a 
court may permit an amendment to 
a charging document, "except that 
if the amendment changes the 
character of the offense charged, the 
consent of the parties is required." 
!d. at 387, 749 A.2d at 770. Next, 
the court examined the history ofRule 
4-204, noting that it was derived from 
Article 52, section 22 of the 1957 
Maryland Code, which allowed the 
amendment of criminal informations 
and warrants, if the amendment did 
not change the character of the 
offense or crime with which the 
accused was charged. !d. at 388, 
749 A.2d at 771 (citing Md. Ann. 
Code art. 52, section22 (1957)). 
Additionally, in 1961, section 
22 of Article 52 was replaced by 
former Maryland Rule 714 that 
applied "form versus substance" 
language to indictments and 
informations, and "character ofthe 
offense" language to warrants. !d. 
Subsequent amendments to Rule 
714 alternated between a 
"character of the offense" and 
"form versus substance" approach 
for indictments and informations. 
!d. Rule 714 was renumbered as 
Rule 713 and amended in 1979 to 
allow amendments to indictments if 
the amendments did not "change the 
substance ofthe indictment." !d. In 
1984, the current version of the 
statute, Md. Rule 4-204, was 
enacted. I d. 
Next, the court reviewed its 
prior decisions that examined 
whether amendments to charging 
documents changed the elements of 
the original crime charged. The court 
noted that whether it used the "form 
versus substance" or "character of 
the offense" test, the controlling factor 
in its analysis was always whether the 
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amendment constituted a "matter of 
form." !d. In Thanos v. State, 282 
Md. 709,387 A.2d286 (1979), the 
original charge of shoplifting could be 
committed by altering or removing a 
label or price tag. !d. The amendment 
substituted "remove" for the word 
"alter" without the defendant's 
consent. !d. at 388-89, 749 A.2d at 
771 (citing Thanos, 282 Md. at 716, 
387 A.2d at 290). Here the court 
applied both tests, and held that the 
amendment was not "simply a matter 
of form" where "it is equally clear that 
the basic description ofthe offense is 
indeed changed when an entirely 
different act is alleged to constitute the 
crime." !d. 
Similarly, in Brown v. State, 285 
Md. 105,400A.2d 1133 (1979), the 
amendment substituted the words 
"one Ford Automobile" to 
"$5462.80," thereby changing the 
identity of the property the defendant 
allegedly obtained by false 
pretenses. !d. at 389, 749 A.2d at 
772. The court held that the 
amendment constituted a 
substantive change because it 
affected the essential facts that 
would prove whether the defendant 
had committed a crime. !d. (citing 
Brown, 285 Md. at 109, 400 A.2d 
at 1135-36). 
In the case at bar, the court 
found that the amendment 
significantly changed the 
description of the specific act charged. 
!d. at 390, 749 A.2d at 772. Instead 
of charging the defendant with 
possession of marijuana, the charge 
was now possession of cocaine. !d. 
Like the amendments in Thanos and 
Brown, the amended information in 
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 66 
Johnson changed the "character of 
the offense alleged." !d. In so holding, 
the court rejected the State's argument 
that the character of the offense was 
not changed because both offenses 
were governed by the same sections 
of the controlled dangerous 
substance statute before and after the 
amendment. !d. Moreover, the 
Thanos court recognized that a 
charging document "may not be 
amended to charge an act not alleged 
in the original document..." !d. (citing 
Thanos 282 Md. at 715, 387 A.2d 
at 289). 
The court also cited 
Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 
567 A.2d 126 (1989), which held 
that the legislature intended to 
regulate each type of controlled 
substance and to authorize a 
separate conviction for possession 
of each substance in sections 286 
and 287 of the controlled dangerous 
substance statute. !d. at 391, 749 
A.2d at 772 (citing Cunningham, 
318 Mdat 187-88,567 A.2dat 128-
29). Turning to the case at bar, the 
court noted that penalties for 
possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute and possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute varied 
significantly. !d. Additionally, because 
identification of a controlled substance 
must be considered an element of the 
crime, the State must prove the 
particular type of substance it has 
allegedinordertoconvict. !d. at391-
392, 749 A.2d at 773 (citing 
Simpson, 318 Md. at 198-99, 567 
A.2d at 133-34). 
In the instant case, the court 
ruled that because the amendment 
changes the identity of a controlled 
dangerous substance, the defendant 
is effectively charged with a 
different offense and the amendment 
is invalid. !d. at 392, 749 A.2d at 
773. Rejecting the State's 
contention that amending the 
information was not prejudicial, the 
court opined that the purpose of 
Rule 4-204 was to prevent any 
unfair surprise to the defendant, and 
to allow the defendant and his 
counsel to adequately prepare for 
trial. !d. Accordingly, the court of 
appeals determined that the 
amendment was prejudicial 
because it changed the character of 
the offense by substituting "cocaine" 
for "marijuana" without the 
defendant's consent. 
The decision in Johnson sends 
a message, loud and clear, that both 
the letter and intent of Rule 4-204 
must be followed. The court has 
clearly delineated the standard by 
which amendments to charging 
documents are to be assessed. If 
the amendment alters the elements 
ofthe crime with which a defendant 
is charged, the change is substantive. 
The State must obtain the accused's 
or her consent or face the prospect 
of reversal on appeal. In the future, 
prosecutors must ensure that the 
charging document accurately 
reflects the charges the State intends 
to prosecute. This ruling preserves 
the defendant's right to withhold 
consent to an amendment that 
changes the offense charged, and 
signals defense attorneys to 
carefully monitor any proposed 
amendments made by the 
prosecution once the initial charging 
document is completed. 
